We investigate the security against the intercept/resend attack and the delayed measurement attack on the quantum key distribution protocol based on the preand post-selection effect. In 2001, Bub proposed the quantum cryptography scheme, which was an application of the so-called mean king's problem. We evaluate the probability that legitimate users cannot detect the eavesdropper's malicious acts. We also estimate the probability that the eavesdropper guesses right at the random secret key one of the legitimate users tries to share with the other one. On the one hand we conclude that this protocol is weaker than the Bennett-Brassard protocol of 1984 (BB84) under the intercept/resend attack. On the other hand we prove the eavesdropper's impossibility of the delayed measurement attack on this protocol. Because of this impossibility, Bub's protocol is unique among other quantum key distribution schemes.
Introduction
The quantum key distribution is one of the practical goals that researchers in the field of quantum information attempt to achieve from both theoretical and experimental points of view. Since the Bennett-Brassard protocol of 1984 (BB84) and the Ekert protocol of 1991 (E91) were proposed, the security of the quantum key distribution protocols has been studied eagerly [1, 2, 3] . on a single qubit that belongs to the initial entangled state. Third, we take a measurement on the composite system with an operator whose eigenvectors are entangled. Then, we obtain results of measurements of σ x , σ y , and σ z with a probability of unity although these operators do not commute. This counter-intuitive phenomenon is regarded as one of the pre-and post-selection effects.
The above process is known as a solution of the mean king's problem [12] . The Bub's quantum key distribution protocol is a natural application of the result obtained in Ref. [11] . First, Alice prepares the initial two-qubit entangled state, and second, Bob performs the measurement of σ x or σ z at random on the single qubit owned by the initial two-qubit state. Third, Alice carries out the final measurement with the entangled basis. Because the results of the measurements of σ x and σ z are ascertained with a probability of unity, Alice can share a random secret key with Bob.
In the present paper, first, we examine the security against the intercept/resend attack on Bub's quantum key distribution protocol by evaluating the probability that Alice and Bob cannot detect Eve's illegal acts and the probability that Eve guesses right at the random secret key Alice obtains. We show that these probabilities are given by 5/6 = 0.833... and (5 + 3 √ 2)/10 = 0.924... respectively if Eve uses the Breidbart basis. From these results, we can conclude that Bub's protocol is more vulnerable than BB84 under the intercept/resend attack.
Second, we prove that Eve cannot make the delayed measurement attack on Bub's protocol. For example, Cirac and Gisin showed that the delayed measurement attack is more effective than the intercept/resend attack on BB84 [13] . Thus, the impossibility of the delayed measurement attack lets Bub's protocol be unique among other quantum key distribution schemes.
So far, the security against each specified attack on Bub's quantum key distribution protocol has not been studied in a systematic manner. This is the motivation for the current paper.
Here, we mention some preceding studies. Yoshida, Miyadera, and Imai derived tradeoff inequalities indicating that an increase of Eve's information gain caused a rise of Alice and Bob's detection rate for Eve's illegal acts during slightly modified Bub's quantum key distribution protocol [14] . In the protocol, they did not divide the sequence of the transmissions into particular subsequences as Bub's original protocol does, but chose transmitted qubits at random for monitoring Eve's malicious acts. Because of this modification, Eve was able to take an attack scenario in which Eve observed her own entangled subsystem after listening to Alice and Bob's public discussion. Specifically, in the considerations of Yoshida et al., the delayed measurement attack was effective and useful for Eve.
In Ref. [15] , Yoshida et al. proposed simplified quantum key distribution protocols that were applications of the mean king's problem. Werner, Franz, and Werner also proposed another version of the quantum key distribution protocol based on the mean king's problem and examined its security against coherent attacks [16] . In Ref. [16] , Werner et al. proved the following, which is satisfied in general for the family of the quantum key distribution protocols based on the mean king's problem. If Eve does not interfere in the perfect key agreement between Alice and Bob, she cannot learn any information about the shared secret key.
The present paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2, we explain Bub's quantum key distribution protocol step by step. In Sect. 3, we formulate the intercept/resend attack on the protocol. In Sect. 4, we consider cases where specific relations hold for the intercept/resend attack. We show that the Breidbart basis is optimum for Eve's attack. In Sect. 5, we prove the impossibility of the delayed measurement attack on the protocol. In Sect. 6, we give brief discussion.
The quantum key distribution protocol
In 2001, Bub proposed a quantum key distribution protocol based on the pre-and postselection effect [7] . This protocol is a natural application of the result obtained in Ref. [11] . We explain the protocol step by step in this section. This section is a brief review of Refs. [7, 11] .
The purpose of the scheme is for the legitimate users, Alice and Bob, to exchange a random secret key. We assume that Alice and Bob can utilise both classical and quantum channels. On the one hand, through the classical channel, they can transmit classical signals to each other. The signals are disclosed publicly and the eavesdropper Eve can learn the entire contents of the classical messages. On the other hand, via the quantum channel, Alice and Bob can exchange quantum signals, namely qubits, with each other. We assume that Eve can interact with the quantum channel, but she cannot do this without disturbing the qubits in general.
First, Alice prepares the following maximally entangled initial state,
where the subscripts A and C represent the auxiliary and channel qubits, respectively. The basis {| ↑ , | ↓ } denotes a pair of the eigenstates of σ z . Alice keeps the auxiliary qubit handy. The channel qubit is transmitted between Alice and Bob through the quantum channel. Second, Alice sends the channel qubit to Bob. Third, receiving the channel qubit, Bob observes either σ x or σ z at random on it. After the measurement, Bob returns the channel qubit to Alice. Fourth, receiving the channel qubit, Alice measures an observable R on the pair of the auxiliary and channel qubits. The operator R has the following four eigenstates:
We pay attention to the facts that {|r i : i = 1, 2, 3, 4} forms an orthonormal basis and
Here, for example, we calculate the probability that Bob obtains an outcome '+1' for σ x and Alice detects |r 1 . We write projection operators of the eigenvalues '+1' and '−1' for σ x asP (σ x = 1) andP (σ x = −1), respectively. We pay attention to the fact that P (σ x = ±1) act on the channel qubits. We obtain
with ease. Thus, describing the probability that Bob's outcome is '+1' for the measurement of σ x and Alice perceives |r 1 as prob(σ x = 1, r 1 ), we achieve
according to the ABL-rule, that is to say Eq. (1) . Similarly, we arrive at
as well.
Equations (5) and (6) imply that Bob obtains the outcome '+1' for the observation of σ x with a probability of unity if Alice detects |r 1 . Moreover, carrying out another similar calculations, we obtain prob(σ z = 1, r 1 ) = 1, prob(σ z = −1, r 1 ) = 0,
and we can show that Bob obtains the outcome '+1' for the observation of σ z with a probability of unity if Alice finds |r 1 .
In the above discussion, we have reached an incredible result. Although the operators σ x and σ z do not commute, both their outcomes of measurements are ascertained with a probability of unity in the case where Alice perceives |r 1 . This phenomenon is regarded as one of the pre-and post-selection effects. Alice's detection of |r 2 , |r 3 , and |r 4 also leads to Bob's determined outcomes of measurements for σ x and σ z . We summarise these results in Table 1 .
Here, we divide the sequence of communications between Alice and Bob into two subsequences. The subsequence S 14 consists of transmissions for which Alice detects |r 1 or |r 4 . The subsequence S 23 consists of transmissions for which she finds |r 2 or |r 3 . On the one hand, for S 14 , if Alice obtains |r 1 , Bob's outcome has to be '+1' for both σ x and σ z . On the other hand, for S 14 , if Alice obtains |r 4 , Bob's outcome has to be '−1' for both σ x and σ z . Contrastingly, on the one hand, for S 23 , if Alice detects |r 2 , Bob obtains the outcome '−1' for σ x and the outcome '+1' for σ z . On the other hand, for S 23 , if Alice perceives |r 3 , Bob obtains the outcome '+1' for σ x and the outcome '−1' for σ z . Table 1 : Relations of Alice's detection for the observable R and Bob's outcomes of measurements for σ x and σ z . These relations are realised with a probability of unity.
Alice and Bob utilise the subsequence S 23 for checking whether or not the channel qubits are monitored by Eve. By contrast, they use the subsequence S 14 to establish a shared random secret key. First of all, Alice publicly announces the indices of the subsequence S 23 via the classical channel. At the same time, Alice discloses whether she detects |r 2 or |r 3 in each transmission of S 23 . Because Alice uses the classical channel for making the public announcements, Eve knows these pieces of information. Receiving these advertisements, Bob examines whether or not his outcomes for σ x and σ z are consistent with Alice's announcements. If he finds even a single discrepancy between his measurements and Alice's advertisements, he concludes that Eve eavesdrops on their transmissions. By contrast, if Bob cannot find any contradictions, he believes that there is no illegal act executed by Eve. If Bob judges that the transmissions are not interfered with by Eve, Alice obtains a series of '+1' and '−1' according to detections of |r 1 and |r 4 and Bob obtains that by the outcomes of measurements of σ x and σ z .
If Alice and Bob follow the protocol correctly without Eve's disturbance, the probabilities that Alice obtains |r i for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are the same and given by 1/4.
The intercept/resend attack
We define the intercept/resend attack as follows. Eve measures the single qubit Alice sends with an orthonormal basis {|ξ 0 , |ξ 1 }. After the measurement with the projection operators, on the one hand, if Eve obtains |ξ 0 , she sends |ξ 0 to Bob, where {|ξ 0 , |ξ 1 } is another orthonormal basis. On the other hand, if Eve detects |ξ 1 , she sends |ξ 1 to Bob.
However, in the present paper, we consider a simpler intercept/resend attack than the above. We assume that Eve intercepts the single transmitted qubit with the orthonormal basis {|ξ 0 , |ξ 1 } and resends an alternative qubit with the same basis {|ξ 0 , |ξ 1 } according to the result of her measurement. This process is equal to the situation where Eve performs the measurement on the single qubit Alice sends with the projection operatorsP (σ ξ = 1) andP (σ ξ = −1). Figure 1 shows the block diagram of Eve's strategy. In the current paper, we assume that Eve intercepts the qubit travelling from Alice to Bob.
Hence, in this section, we consider the case where Eve measures σ ξ on the channel qubit sent by Alice and resends it to Bob. We assume that σ ξ represents an observable of the spin along an arbitrary direction.
First, we derive an explicit form of the projection operators of σ ξ . We prepare Euler's Alice Eve
Bob
The measurement of the two-qubit state
The initially entangled qubits
The intercept/resend attack The observation of x or z Figure 1 : The block diagram of Eve's strategy for the intercept/resend attack.
rotation matrix for SU(2) as follows [17] :
where 0 ≤ α < 4π, 0 ≤ β < 4π, and 0 ≤ γ < 4π. Using U(α, β, γ), we can write down the projection operators of σ ξ aŝ
For example, putting (α, β) = (0, 0), (0, π/2), and (π/2, π/2), we obtain σ ξ = σ z , σ x and σ y , respectively. For the sake of convenience in the rest of the current paper, we calculate the following equations. We pay attention to the fact thatP (σ x = ±1),P (σ z = ±1), andP (σ ξ = ±1) act on the channel qubit.
Here, we define the probability that is useful for the discussion in the rest of the current paper. For example, we describe the probability that Bob has σ x = i, Eve obtains σ ξ = j, and Alice detects |r 2 as
(19) In the following paragraphs, we consider the strategy of the eavesdropper Eve. First, Eve needs to let Alice and Bob not notice her illegal acts. To think in concrete terms, we assume a case where Bob observes σ x and Alice detects |r 2 . In this case, Eve had better make j∈{1,−1} prob(σ x = −1, σ ξ = j, r 2 ) greater in value and let Alice and Bob not find evidence of her eavesdropping. Similarly, if Bob observes σ z and Alice detects |r 2 , Eve has to make j∈{1,−1} prob(σ z = 1, σ ξ = j, r 2 ) greater in value. If Bob measures σ x and Alice perceives |r 3 , Eve had better let j∈{1,−1} prob(σ x = 1, σ ξ = j, r 3 ) be larger. If Bob measures σ z and Alice perceives |r 3 , Eve should have j∈{1,−1} prob(σ z = −1, σ ξ = j, r 3 ) larger in value.
Second, Eve has to guess right at the random bit of the secret key that Alice obtains. To put the discussion more concretely, we consider a case where Bob observes σ x and Alice detects |r 1 . In this case, Eve had better make i∈{1,−1} prob(σ x = i, σ ξ = 1, r 1 ) greater in value. If Eve wants to guess right at the random secret bit that Bob obtains, she has to let i∈{1,−1} prob(σ x = i, σ ξ = i, r 1 ) be larger. However, in the current paper, we do not examine this strategy. If Bob measures σ z and Alice detects |r 1 , Eve has to enlarge the probability i∈{1,−1} prob(σ z = i, σ ξ = 1, r 1 ). If Bob observes σ x and Alice perceives |r 4 , Eve should have i∈{1,−1} prob(σ x = i, σ ξ = −1, r 4 ) larger. If Bob measures σ z and Alice finds |r 4 , Eve had better enlarge the probability i∈{1,−1} prob(σ z = i, σ ξ = −1, r 4 ).
To evaluate the probabilities that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve's malicious acts in the subsequence S 23 , we calculate the following eight functions:
Here, the following relations hold between the probabilities and the above eight functions:
j∈{1,−1}
Using these functions, we can evaluate the probability that Alice and Bob cannot notice evidence of Eve's illegal acts as follows. If Bob obtains σ x = −1 and Alice detects |r 2 , it is given by
If Bob has σ z = 1 and Alice perceives |r 2 , it is given by j∈{1,−1}
If Bob obtains σ x = 1 and Alice detects |r 3 , it is given by j∈{1,−1}
If Bob has σ z = −1 and Alice finds |r 3 , it is given by j∈{1,−1}
To let Alice and Bob not find a sign of Eve's eavesdropping, Eve has to make g 1 (α, β), f 2 (α, β), f 3 (α, β), and g 4 (α, β) larger and f 1 (α, β), g 2 (α, β), g 3 (α, β), and f 4 (α, β) smaller in value. However, only from this principle, it is difficult for us to obtain optimum α and β for Eve's attack.
Thus, to let the problem be simple, we make it a condition that the following relation holds:
In other words, Eve sets a plan in which the parameters α and β satisfy Eq. (32). In Sect. 4, we analyse this plan of Eve's in detail.
Here, we evaluate the probability that Eve guesses right at the random secret bit Alice obtains in the subsequence S 14 . To perform this evaluation, the following eight functions are useful:
Then, the following relations hold between the probabilities and the above eight functions:
We can derive the probability that Eve guesses right at the random secret bit Alice obtains as follows. If Bob observes σ x and Alice detects |r 1 , it is given by
If Bob observes σ z and Alice perceives |r 1 , it is given by
If Bob measures σ x and Alice detects |r 4 , it is given by
If Bob measures σ z and Alice finds |r 4 , it is given by
We describe the probability that Alice detects |r i for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 as Q i . Then, we obtain the following relation: 
Hence, the parameter β is a function of the parameter α,
The case where β = arctan(1/ cos α) holds
In this subsection, we consider the case where β = arctan(1/ cos α) holds. Substituting β = arctan(1/ cos α) into Eqs. (20), (21), (22), (23), (33), (34), (35), and (36), we obtain the following functions, where we use the notation f 1 (α) = f 1 (α, β)| β=arctan(1/ cos α) :
Here, we pay attention to a relation,
Thus, the ratio of the probability that Alice detects |r 2 to the probability that she perceives |r 3 is given by one to one. Then, we obtain the probability that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve's illegal acts as Figure 2 : Graphs of the probabilities that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve's eavesdropping as functions of the parameter α. A thick solid curve, a thin solid curve, and a thin dashed curve represent the functions P 1 (α),
, respectively. The function P 1 (α) becomes maximum at α = 0 and α = π.
By contrast, we pay attention to a relation,
Thus, in general, the ratio of the probability that Alice detects |r 1 to the probability that she perceives |r 4 is not always given by one to one. Hence, we obtain the probability that Eve guesses right at the random secret bit Alice obtains as
We show graphs of P 1 (α) and P 2 (α) in Figs. 2 and 3 , respectively. We put 0 ≤ α < 2π because it is enough for the range of α. In Fig. 2 , the graphs show the probabilities that Alice and Bob do not find a sign of Eve's malicious acts against the parameter α. The function P 1 (α) becomes maximum at α = 0 and α = π. In Fig. 3 , the graphs show the probabilities that Eve guesses right at the random secret bit Alice obtains against the Figure 3 : Graphs of the probabilities that Eve guesses right at the random secret bit Alice obtains as functions of the parameter α. A thick solid curve, a thin solid curve, and a thin dashed curve represent the functions P 2 (α),
respectively. The function P 2 (α) becomes maximum at α = 0 and α = π.
parameter α. The function P 2 (α) becomes maximum at α = 0 and α = π. Thus, Eve's optimum strategies are given by (α, β) = (0, π/4), (π, 3π/4), (0, 5π/4), (π, 7π/4).
In particular, (α, β) = (0, π/4) represents the attack with the Breidbart basis [4] .
The case where (α, β) = (0, π/4) holds: the Breidbart basis
In this subsection, we consider the case where (α, β) = (0, π/4) holds. Because
the probability that Alice and Bob cannot find Eve's malicious acts is equal to 5/6 = 0.833.... Moreover, because
the probability that Eve guesses right at a random secret bit Alice obtains is given by 1 10
Furthermore, ratios of the probabilities that Alice detects |r i for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are
4.3 The case where β = arctan(−1/ cos α) holds
In this subsection, we consider the case where β = arctan(−1/ cos α) holds. Substituting β = arctan(−1/ cos α) into Eqs. (33), (34), (35), and (36), we obtain the following functions, where we use the notation,ũ 1 (α) = u 1 (α, β)| β=arctan(−1/ cos α) :
Thus, the probability that Alice detects |r 1 to the probability that she perceives |r 4 is one to one. Hence, the probability that Eve guesses right at a random secret bit Alice obtains is given bỹ
This implies that Eve obtains a completely random bit, and therefore there is no correlation between Eve and Alice's bits. Hence, Eve cannot gain any information although she eavesdrops on the transmission from Alice to Bob.
The case where (α, β) = (π, π/4) holds
In this subsection, we consider the case where the parameters are given by (α, β) = (π, π/4). In this case, β = arctan(−1/ cos α) holds. Because
the probability that Alice and Bob cannot notice Eve's illegal acts is given by 9/10. Moreover, because
the probability that Eve guesses right at a random secret bit Alice obtains is given as follows. If Bob observes σ x and Alice detects |r 1 , it is equal to (3− √ 2)/6. If Bob observes σ z and Alice perceives |r 1 , it is equal to (3 + √ 2)/6. If Bob measures σ x and Alice detects |r 4 , it is given by (3 − √ 2)/6. If Bob measures σ z and Alice perceives |r 4 , it is given by (3 + √ 2)/6. Thus, the average of the probability that Alice and Eve obtain the same bit is equal to 1/2. Hence, Eve's eavesdropping is useless for this strategy. Furthermore, ratios of the probabilities that Alice detects |r i for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are
5 The impossibility of the delayed measurement attack on the protocol
One of the interesting characteristics Bub's quantum key distribution protocol has is the impossibility of the delayed measurement attack on it. Here, we give a short review of the delayed measurement attack as follows. First, Eve keeps her own some auxiliary qubits handy. Second, Eve applies a unitary transformation to her own auxiliary qubits and the channel qubit Alice sends through the quantum channel to generate entanglement between these qubits. Third, Eve leaves her auxiliary qubits untouched and sends the channel qubit to Bob. Fourth, after listening to the public discussion between Alice and Bob, Eve makes a measurement on her auxiliary qubits depending on the public discussion. Because Eve can change a method of her measurement on her own auxiliary system according to Alice and Bob's public discussion, Eve can enlarge information that she gains by eavesdropping. We can show the impossibility of the delayed measurement attack on the protocol Bub proposed from the following considerations. First, we think about the subsequence S 23 . In this case, Alice and Bob disclose their results of measurements through the classical channel. However, their revealed results have nothing to do with the random secret key they share. Alice and Bob can only notice Eve's illegal acts from their results of the measurements. Therefore, although Eve makes measurements on her own auxiliary qubits after Alice and Bob's public discussion, she cannot obtain any information about the random secret key that Alice and Bob establish. Moreover, Eve's delayed measurement on her own auxiliary system does not affect the probability that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve's illegal acts.
Second, we think about the sequence S 14 . In this case, Alice and Bob do not have public discussion about their measurements. Thus, Eve cannot pursue the delayed measurement attack on the subsequence S 14 . Hence, we can conclude that Eve cannot mount the delayed measurement attack on Bub's protocol.
Generating entanglement between her auxiliary subsystem and the transmitted qubits, Eve can adjust a ratio of the frequency of S 14 to that of S 23 . However, when Alice and Bob disclose their public discussion through the classical channel, it has been determined already whether the transmission belongs to S 14 or S 23 . Hence, Eve cannot gain information of the legitimate users' random secret bit by the delayed measurement attack.
In this section, we have proved that Eve cannot make the delayed measurement attack on Bub's protocol. This implies that Eve cannot make use of the public advertisement disclosed by Alice and Bob via the classical channel to improve her delayed measurement on her auxiliary subsystem and gain more information about the shared secret key. In fact, even if Eve does not utilise Alice and Bob's public discussion, she can obtain some information about the shared key by observing her entangled subsystem. For example, she can try the coherent attack on multiple qubits emitted by Alice.
The impossibility of the delayed measurement attack is one of the unique properties Bub's protocol has.
Discussion
In the current paper, we obtain two facts about Bub's quantum key distribution protocol. The first one is the following. If Eve makes the intercept/resend attack on the transmissions between Alice and Bob under the condition of Eq. (32), Eve's best strategy is the measurement with the Breidbart basis. For this attack on the single transmission, the probability that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve's illegal acts is equal to 5/6 = 0.833... and the probability that Eve guesses right at the secret bit Alice obtains is given by (5 + 3 √ 2)/10 = 0.924.... If Eve pursues the intercept/resend attack on n qubits Alice sends, the probability that Eve's malicious acts are not revealed is given by (5/6) n . This probability decreases exponentially as n becomes larger. Thus, Bub's protocol is safe from the intercept/resend attack.
If Eve makes the intercept/resend attack on the BB84, her best strategy is also the measurement with the Breidbart basis [4] . For this attack on the single transmission, the probability that Alice and Bob do not find signs of Eve's illegal acts is equal to 3/4 and the probability that Eve guesses right at the random secret bit Alice obtains is given by (1/4)(2 + √ 2) = 0.853.... Thus, we can conclude that the BB84 is safer than Bub's protocol concerning to the intercept/resend attack.
The second fact that the current paper shows is the following. Bub's protocol is perfectly secure against the delayed measurement attack. By contrast, if Eve makes the delayed measurement attack on a single transmission of the BB84, the probability that the legitimate users overlook Eve's malicious acts and the probability that Eve guesses right at the random secret bit Alice obtains are given by at least 3/4 and (1/2)[1 + ( √ 3/2)] = 0.933..., respectively [13] . This implies that the delayed measurement attack is more dangerous than the intercept/resend attack for the BB84. Thus, Eve's impossibility of the delayed measurement attack on Bub's protocol is unique among other quantum key distribution schemes.
In the current paper, we do not intend to tell which protocol is better, Bub's one or other quantum key distribution schemes, for example, the BB84. In the present paper, we aim at clarifying characteristic properties of Bub's protocol from a neutral viewpoint. In Refs. [18, 19, 20, 21] , the BB84 was proven secure. In other words, it was rigorously indicated that the BB84 is secure against an enemy who is able to perform any physical operation permitted by the quantum mechanics. Contrastingly, security of Bub's protocol has not been studied well yet. We have to admit that it is not full-grown theoretically and experimentally.
One of the most serious faults Bub's quantum key distribution protocol has is that Alice has to perform measurements of two-qubit states for detection of {|r i : i = 1, 2, 3, 4}. Because {|r i : i = 1, 2, 3, 4} have entanglement, Alice needs to prepare a quantum circuit, which was examined in Refs. [7, 22] .
As mentioned above, experimental realisation of Bub's protocol owns some difficulties. Because the protocol uses a two way quantum channel, it is vulnerable to the channel loss and a noise source, compared with the BB84 and the E91 that make use of a one way quantum channel. Moreover, in Bub's protocol, Bob has to carry out the projective measurement, so that he must not destroy the channel qubit. In contrast, for the BB84 and the E91, Alice and Bob only need to perform an ordinary strong quantum measurement.
The investigation of the BB84 has a long tradition and its practical use has been studied in many papers, for example, Refs. [23, 24, 25, 26] . Noises of the experimental setup lead to increase of the quantum bit error rate. However, in the current paper, we do not evaluate the maximum quantum bit error rate that the legitimate users can accept because we focus on an ideal case where the channel losses and noise sources are not assumed, the photodetectors work perfectly, and so on. In the present paper, we do not argue those experimental aspects and practical uses of Bub's scheme. These problems remain to be examined in the future.
